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Abstract
Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that
the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may
be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria
under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may
be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prots
(welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot-Nash ones. The reversal
of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive
behaviour.
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1 Introduction
A classical issue in modern industrial organization deals with ranking Nash
equilibria generated by price or quantity competition. Absent externalities,
the standard conclusion emerging from such comparison states the social su-
periority of Bertrand competition w.r.t. Cournot competition. This has been
proved in a broad class of static games.1 However, in a homogeneous product
oligopoly, the comparison between the two types of equilibria has been long
limited by the strict assumptions about technology needed to ensure the exis-
tence of a pure strategy equilibrium under Bertrand rules. Such a limitation
has been bypassed by Dastidar (1995), proving that, under concave demand
and convex costs, price competition in a homogeneous oligopoly yields a
continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This result may
then allow one to challenge the alleged greater e¢ ciency of Bertrand-Nash
equilibria w.r.t. the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As long as Bertrand-Nash
behaviour doesnt need to coincide with marginal cost pricing, the standard
ranking between Bertrand-Nash and Cournot-Nash prots and social welfare
may be reversed. In this note, indeed, we show that, in the continuum of
price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost
pricing may be observed. As a result, in a broad range of the parameter con-
stellation, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prots (welfare) may be higher (lower)
than Cournot-Nash ones. Its worth noting that the reversal of the standard
rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set
up the model and solve the two games. In section 3, we perform some
comparative statics, instrumental to our main results illustrated in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
1See, fon instance, Singh and Vives (1984), Vives (1985), Okuguchi (1987) and Dastidar
(1997). With cost asymmetry and a small degree of product di¤erentiation, Zanchettin
(2006) shows that the opposite can occur.
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2 Setup and Nash equilibria
Consider a market supplied by a set N = 1; 2; 3; :::; n of identical rms pro-
ducing a homogeneous good whose demand function is p = 1   Q; where
Q = ni=1qi is aggregate output and p is price. All rms share the same tech-
nology, summarised by the convex cost function Ci = cq2i =2. Accordingly,
the prot function of rm i is
i =

p  cqi
2

qi =

1  qi  Q i   cqi
2

qi (1)
where Q i = j 6=iqj.
Firms play simultaneously a non-cooperative one-shot game under com-
plete, symmetric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the
Nash equilibrium.
2.1 The quantity-setting game
If rms are Cournot players, the relevant rst order condition for rm i is:
@i
@qi
= 1  2qi  Q i   cqi = 0 (2)
which, under the symmetry condition qj = qi = q for all i and j, yields the
Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium output
qCN =
1
n+ 1 + c
(3)
for each individual rm. The resulting equilibrium prots are
CN =
2 + c
2 (n+ 1 + c)2
(4)
and social welfare is
SWCN = nCN + CSCN =
n (n+ 2 + c)
2 (n+ 1 + c)2
(5)
where CSCN =
 
nqCN
2
=2 is consumer surplus.
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2.2 The price-setting game
Here, we follow Dastidar (1995), where it is shown that, if costs are strictly
convex in output levels, Bertrand competition yields a continuum of Nash
equilibria. The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies involves indeed all rms
setting the same price p 2 [pavc; pu] : At the lower bound pavc; equilibrium
price equals average variable costs, so that rms would be indi¤erent between
producing or not. At the upper bound pu; the equilibrium price is such that
rms would be indi¤erent between playing pu or marginally undercutting it
in order to capture the entire market demand.
The range of equilibrium prices is identied by:2
pBN =
c
c+ 2 (n  ) (6)
where BN mnemonics for Bertrand-Nash, and  is a non-negative parameter
whose range, to be specied below, determines the continuum of equilibrium
prices. The associated individual output and prots are
qBN =
2 (n  )
n [c+ 2 (n  )] (7)
BN =
2c (n  )
n2 [c+ 2 (n  )]2 (8)
and social welfare is
SWBN = nBN + CSBN =
2 (n  ) [n (n  ) + c]
n [2 (n  ) + c]2 (9)
The admissible range is  2 [0; n2= (1 + n)] : This is because
 in  = 0; the equilibrium price equals average variable cost;
 at  = n=2; marginal cost pricing obtains;
 if  = n2= (1 + n) ; pBN reaches the highest level above which under-
cutting takes place.
2See Dastidar (1995, pp. 27-28); and Gori et al. (2014, pp. 373-75).
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3 Comparative statics
The very fact of the existence of a continuum of price equilibria ranging
well above marginal cost pricing raises two related questions. The rst deals
with the monotonicity (or the lack thereof) of equilibrium prots w.r.t. the
number of rms under Bertrand competition. The second issue is whether
the prot ranking across the two regimes is robust to variations in industry
structure as measured by the number of rms, and/or the price mark-up
determined by the value of . In this section we tackle the rst question,
while the second is postponed to the next section.
For completeness, we set out by summarising the e¤ect of an increase in
n on Cournot-Nash equilibrium prots. This is captured by the following
derivative:3
@CN
@n
=   c+ 2
(n+ 1 + c)3
< 0 (10)
everywhere. This is the standard result we are well accustomed with, telling
that individual prots are monotonically decreasing in the number of quantity-
setting rms.
Now we examine the behaviour of Bertrand prots w.r.t. n in our setting,
where there exists a continuum of equilibria. We are going to prove the
following:
Lemma 1 @BN=@n > 0 for all n 2  nB ; nB+ and negative elsewhere, with
nB =
10  cpc2 + 28c + 42
12
Proof. The partial derivative of Bertrand-Nash prots w.r.t. n is:
@BN
@n
=
2c [2 (5n  2)  6n2   c (n  2)]
n3 [c+ 2 (n  )]3 (11)
3As usual, we are treating n as a continuous magnitude when performing comparative
statics. As soon as we will be looking at numerical examples, we will conne our attention
to integers.
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Since n > n2= (n+ 1) ; which is the upper bound of the admissible interval for
, the denominator of (11) is strictly positive. Hence, the sign of @BN=@n
is the sign of the numerator. The roots of
2 (5n  2)  6n2   c (n  2) = 0 (12)
are
nB =
10  cpc2 + 28c + 42
12
(13)
and, given the concavity of the numerator w.r.t. n, this implies that @BN=@n >
0 for all n 2  nB ; nB+ : Outside this range, @BN=@n < 0:
Notice that, in order for the interval
 
nB ; n
B
+

to be economically mean-
ingful, it must be that at least nB+  2; i.e.,
nB+   2 =
10  24  c+pc2 + 28c + 42
12
 0 (14)
The existence of a range of industry structures wherein an increase in the
number of rms yields an increase in the Bertrand-Nash prots suggests that
Bertand-Nash prots might overcome those generated by those associated to
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the next section we show that this can
indeed happen in an admissible portion of the parameter space.
4 Ranking equilibrium prots and welfare
Under marginal cost pricing, it would be true that CN > BN for all n 
2. However, since we follow Dastidars (1995) approach to model Bertrand
competition, we have to admit the possibility for BN to increase in n due
to the presence of a mark-up exceeding its competitive level as  increases
above n=2:
To investigate whether this brings about a reversal of fortune across equi-
libria, it is appropriate to redene the upper bound of  in terms of a lower
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bound to n: This trivially requires solving the following inequality:
 (n+ 1)  n2 (15)
w.r.t. n, which delivers the equivalent condition
n  +
p
 (+ 4)
2
 n (16)
If one compares n against nB; it turns out that
n  nB  =
c  4+ 6p (+ 4) +pc2 + 28c + 42
12
> 0 (17)
everywhere, because 3
p
 (+ 4) > 2. Therefore, n > nB  always.
The comparison between n and nB involves evaluating the sign of the
following expression:
n  nB+ =
c  4+ 6p (+ 4) pc2 + 28c + 42
12
(18)
Again, c   4 + 6p (+ 4) > 0 since 3p (+ 4) > 2. Consequently,
the sign of n  nB+ is the sign ofh
c  4+ 6
p
 (+ 4)
i2
   c2 + 28c + 42 (19)
which can be usefully rewritten as
48

3 +  
p
 (+ 4)

+ 12c
p
 (+ 4)  3

(20)
where 48

3 +  p (+ 4) > 0 for all admissible values of ; whilep
 (+ 4)  3 R 0 for all  S 1=2. Thus,
 if  2 [0; 1=2] ; n > nB+ everywhere;
 if  > 1=2; (i) n > nB+ for all c 2 (0;ec); (ii) n  nB+ for all c  ec; with
ec   (2+ 5)  (2  3)p (+ 4)
2  1 : (21)
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When  > 1=2; @ec=@ < 0 and @2ec=@2 > 0; as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 The critical theshold of c.
6
-
c

R1
R2
R3
n > nB+
n  nB+
(0; 0) 1=2
ec
Accordingly, we may identify three regions: R1  f 2 [0; 1=2] ; c > 0g ;
R2  f > 1=2; c 2 (0;ec)g ; R3  f > 1=2; c > ecg : By inspecting the rank-
ing between n and nB+ in these three regions, we draw the following:
Lemma 2 In bR  R1 [R2, n > nB+: In R3; n  nB+:
In the space (c; n) ; Lemma 2 gives rise to Figures 2-3, where n is a at line
because it is independent of c. In Figure 2,  2 [0; 1=2] ; so that n > nB+ > nB .
Since n must be at least as high as n; in this case @BN=@n < 0 for all
admissible n.
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Figure 2 The sign of @BN=@n in the space (c; n),  < 1=2.
6
-
n
c
nB 
nB+
n
@BN=@n < 0
0
In Figure 3,  > 1=2 and therefore n R nB+ for all c Q ec; and n; nB+ > nB 
for all c > 0. In this case, as soon as nB+ > n; we have a region wherein
@BN=@n > 0:
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Figure 3 The sign of @BN=@n in the space (c; n),  > 1=2.
6
-
n
c
nB 
nB+
n
@BN=@n < 0
@BN=@n > 0
0 ec
-
Since it must be n  n; then Lemma 2 delivers, without further proof,
the following result:
Proposition 3 If  2 [0; 1=2] ; @BN=@n < 0 for all c > 0 and all n  n: If
 > 1=2; @BN=@n > 0 for all c > ec and all n 2  n; nB+ ; while it is negative
in the remainder of the admissible parameter range.
Now we are ready to characterise the ranking of equilibrium prots and
welfare between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. To perform this task, we
produce the necessary and su¢ cient condition for BN > CN :
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Proposition 4 Take  2

n
2
;
n2
n+ 1

: Dene
c1  2 (n  )
2  n
c2  2n (n  )  +
p
 [4n3 + + 4n (  n (+ 1))]
2  n
For all c 2 (min fec; c1g ; c2) ; BN > CN and SWCN > SWBN :
Proof. The di¤erence between BN and CN can be written as
BN CN = [c (2  n)  2 (n  )] [4n
2 (n  ) + 2c (2n (n  )  )  c2 (2  n)]
2n2 (n+ 1 + c)2 [2 (n  ) + c]2
(22)
The denominator of the r.h.s. of (22) is always positive. The numerator is
nil at
c1  2 (n  )
2  n
c2  2n (n  )  +
p
 [4n3 + + 4n (  n (+ 1))]
2  n
c3  2n (n  )   
p
 [4n3 + + 4n (  n (+ 1))]
2  n
(23)
with c2 > c1 > c3 for all  2

n
2
;
n2
n+ 1

and n  2.
Given that c (2  n)  2 (n  ) > 0 for all c > c1 and
4n2 (n  ) + 2c (2n (n  )  )  c2 (2  n) > 0 (24)
for all c 2 (c3; c2) ; BN > CN for all c 2 (0; c3) and all c 2 (c1; c2) :
However, from Proposition 3, we have to account for the lower bound to c
for @BN=@n > 0; i.e., c > ec; with ec 2 (c3; c2) everywhere, although ec may be
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higher or lower than c1 in the admissible range of n and . Hence, we may
disregard all c 2 (0; c3) ; and we are left with the interval c 2 (min fec; c1g ; c2) ;
where indeed BN > CN holds.
The di¤erence between welfare levels writes:
SWCN SWBN = [2 (n  )  c (2  n)] [c (n
2   2 (n+ 1))  2n (n  )  c2 (2  n)]
2n (n+ 1 + c)2 [2 (n  ) + c]2
(25)
Solving SWCN   SWBN = 0 w.r.t. c; one obtains the following roots:
c1  2 (n  )
2  n
c4 
n (n  2)  2+
q
8 (n  2) (n  ) + [n (n  2)  2]2
2 (2  n)
c5 
n (n  2)  2 
q
8 (n  2) (n  ) + [n (n  2)  2]2
2 (2  n)
(26)
Notice that solution c1 is the same root solving CN = BN :4 Moreover, the
remaining two roots might not be real because  > n=2 as price becomes
larger than marginal cost in the Bertrand case. If c4; c5 2 R, then c1 > c4 >
c5:Then, observe that c4 and c5 are generated by the expression appearing in
the second square bracket at the numerator of (25), which is parabolic and
concave in c: Therefore, two cases may arise:
 c4; c5 2 R: if so, then c1 > c4 > c5 and consequently SWCN > SWBN
for all c > c1;
 c4; c5 =2 R: if so, then c (n2   2 (n+))   2n (n  )   c2 (2  n) < 0
because the coe¢ cient of c2 is negative above marginal cost pricing.
Hence, again, SWCN > SWBN for all c > c1:
4Incidentally, it is worth noting that c1 also solves pCN = pBN ; with pCN < pBN for
all c > c1: By the same token, qCN > qBN for all c > c1:
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This completes the proof.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 can be explained as follows. First,
notice that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prots outperform prots in the
Cournot setting when @BN=@n > 0; as from Proposition 3. This anti-
competitive e¤ect of expanding the population of rms on Bertrand prots
occurs when both  and the parameter scaling marginal cost, c, are suf-
ciently high. As one can see from (6), pBN is increasing in both para-
meters. Hence, @BN=@n > 0 when the Bertrand equilibrium price sig-
nicantly departs from marginal cost pricing to mimic collusive behaviour.
Another way of grasping the result consists in observing that, in the region
 2 (n=2; n2= (n+ 1)] ; pBN > pCN and qCN < qBN for all c > c1; which
amounts to saying that if the Bertrand equilibrium price departs from mar-
ginal cost and the latter is su¢ ciently high, then the Cournot output becomes
lower than the Bertrand one, causing the prot and welfare ranking to ip
over.
4.1 An example
In order to construct an example where @BN=@n > 0, BN > CN and
SWCN > SWBN ; we have to take a triple f; c; ng satisfying all of the
aforementioned constraints, i.e.:
  2

n
2
;
n2
n+ 1

 c 2 (min fec; c1g ; c2)
 n 2  min f2; ng ; nB+
One such triple is f = 4; c = 6; n = 5g ; at which
@BN
@n
=
3
1000
; BN =
3
100
; CN =
1
36
; SWCN =
65
288
; SWBN =
29
160
(27)
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BN   CN = 1
450
; SWCN   SWBN = 2
45
(28)
ec = 4  13  5p2
7
= 3:38; c1 =
2
3
; c2 = 2
 
1 + 2
r
7
3
!
= 8:11 (29)
nB+ =
17 +
p
193
6
= 5:14; n = 2

1 +
p
2

= 4:83 (30)
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proved that the traditional ranking between Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria may be reversed under convex variable costs. The
presence of a continuum of price equilibria allows for departures from mar-
ginal cost pricing, to such an extent that Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prots
become higher than Cournot-Nash ones. In the same region of parameters
where this happens, the opposite occurs to the sequence of social welfare
levels. These reversals are driven by the fact that equilibrium pricing mimics
collusion.
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